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Introduction to Rethinking Rorty’s
Pragmatism: Ethics after
Epistemology
Michela Bella and Chris Voparil
1 We are in the midst of a reevaluation of Richard Rorty’s pragmatism. The last few years
have seen a spate of  new books on Rorty.1 This  year alone two critical  anthologies
already  are  out  and  two  more  are  in  preparation.2 A  new  volume  of  previously
unpublished philosophical papers by Rorty will be released in a few months (see Rorty
2020).  The intensification of  interest  since his  passing in  2007 spans the globe and
shows no signs of abating. Spurred in part by a new generation of readers of American
philosophy who have come to the classical figures of pragmatism through Rorty and
harbor no preexisting antipathies,  the scholarly reception of  Rorty as  an unhelpful
interloper who did as much to distort as to revive the tradition is giving way to fruitful
dialogues,  constructive  engagements,  and  immanent  critiques  from  which  we  can
learn.  Readers  are  patiently  distinguishing  Rorty’s  more  outrageous  side  from  his
penetrating insights and incisive criticisms (see Rey 2017). The long delayed “new stage
of creative and scholarly work on pragmatism and the several pragmatists,” which one
commentator predicted, back in 1982, Rorty’s work would initiate, now finally is upon
us (Brodsky 1982: 333).
2 The  title  of  the  symposium,  “Rethinking  Rorty’s  Pragmatism:  Ethics  after
Epistemology,” expresses the central aim of this issue: to continue the conversation
about the consequences for ethics of Rorty’s famous critique of modern epistemology
and its well-known concern with knowledge and representation. The issue features new
work that seeks to challenge the divides between and among “classico,” “paleo,” “neo,”
and “new” pragmatisms, by rethinking the interconnection of ethics and epistemology
through, with, or beyond Rorty’s pragmatism. The opening article of our symposium is
Giovanni Maddalena’s “Rorty as a Legitimate Member of the Pragmatist Family,” which
is a critical update of the legitimacy of Rorty’s membership in the pragmatist family.
Reexamining  many  criticisms,  which  mainly  focused  on  Rorty’s  problematic
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relationship  with  Peirce’s  philosophy,  Maddalena  detects  “family  resemblances”
between their conceptions and suggests three core topics that prove how Rorty shared
central aspects of the classical pragmatists’ common project. These topics are Rorty’s
anti-Kantism,  the  “synthetic  drive”  animating  his  philosophical  attitude,  and  his
transformative view of philosophy. On the first aspect, Maddalena claims that one can
be  more  precise  than  Rorty  in  assaulting  Kantianism  in  the  name  of  anti-
foundationalism for “the real problem with the Kantian picture of philosophy, a good
representative of the modern tradition of philosophy, is that foundation according to
Kant has to be necessary and a priori.” Maddalena is cautious about Rorty’s opportunity
to  extend his  criticism of  Kantism to  modernity  tout  court,  and  accuses  Rorty  of  a
certain  preconceptual  historicism.  Indeed,  Maddalena  envisages  the  possibility  of  a
convergence  between  Rorty’s  and  Peirce’s  views  on  the  basis  of  the  mind-world
continuity  mathematically  investigated  by  Peirce,  and  what  Maddalena  defines  as
Peirce’s  a  posteriori  foundationalism.  With regard to  the  synthetic  drive  in  Rorty’s
philosophy, Maddalena acknowledges his profound affinity with the “tendency of the
entire  classic  movement  to  go  beyond  the  analytic  frame  that  encompasses  the
epistemology  of  modern  philosophy.”  However,  he  considers  Rorty’s  exclusive
preoccupation  with  Kantism  a  limitation  on  the  possibility  of  rethinking  a  new
epistemology and a  new metaphysics  in  a  renovelled synthetic  perspective.  Finally,
moving from “systematic philosophy” to “edifying philosophy,” in a transformative
sense, and therefore open to political commitment, for Maddalena Rorty’s attack on the
separation between the fields of inquiry diverges from classical pragmatists. In the end,
Maddalena  finds  that  Rorty  underestimates  the  role  of  inquiry  in  his  reading  of
classical pragmatism, and of Dewey in particular.
3 Four  articles  concentrate  on  Rorty’s  discussion  of  epistemology,  addressing  in  new
ways  different  but  interconnected  topics.  In  “Does  Rorty  have  a  Blindspot  about
Truth?,” David Macarthur analyses the controversial role normativity plays in Rorty’s
conception of truth. He presents his criticisms of several major objections to Rorty’s
position, mainly engaging in direct discussion with Huw Price. Macarthur’s defence of
Rorty from Price’s  “off-target” argument that  “Rorty’s  norm of  communal  warranted
assertibility suffers the same fate as the norm he calls personal  warranted assertibility,
namely,  that  without  a  distinct  norm  of  truth  neither  norm  can  make  sense  of
improvements in one’s epistemic standing whether in terms of the actual community
or  future  extensions  and improvements  of  it”  is  particularly  sophisticated. Against
Price’s  static  or  majoritarian conception of  justification,  Macarthur calls  on Rorty’s
dynamic  conception of  justification and the normative  pressure  deriving from new
methods  of inquiry,  or  what  Macarthur  defines  as  his  “progressive  perfectionist
conception of communal norms.” Once we renounce the familiar misinterpretation of
Rorty as having a majoritarian conception of  justification,  Price’s  criticism loses its
strength. Nonetheless, Macarthur identifies another blindspot in Rorty’s conception of
truth, which is the lack of coherence in first-person reflection. He argues that Rorty’s
notion  of  truth  needs  to  be  complemented  by  specific  attention  to  the  norm  of
consistency as  an integral  part  of  the  truth-commitments  required by any rational
system of beliefs. What, however, survives any criticism and perhaps is Rorty’s greatest
legacy, is his neopragmatist perspective about truth – namely, his acknowledgement of
the “embeddedness of truth in our linguistic and interpretative practices.”
4 Michela Bella’s “The Interlacing of Science and Ethics: Rorty’s Critique of Epistemology
for  a  Pragmatist  Hermeneutics”  focuses  on Rorty’s  hermeneutical  understanding of
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science and ethics, and their relation, as a way to investigate his pragmatist reshaping
of  hermeneutics.  Bella  insists  on  the  Jamesian  and  Deweyan  element  in  Rorty’s
perspective as deeply inspired by their holistic-syncretic understanding of pragmatism.
In  this  perspective,  she  identifies  an  “eirenic  strategy”  that  emerges  in  Rorty’s
approach to  moral  and scientific  issues,  which is  the  result  of  his  movement  from
epistemology  to  hermeneutics.  The  Rortyan  reformulation  of  scientific  rationality
aligns  particularly  with the Jamesian intent  of  confronting scientific  dogmatism by
questioning the key notion of truth and reconsidering the opposition between scientific
and ethical beliefs. Rorty’s personal and historical conception of ethics contrasts with
the  notion  of  scientific  rationality  elaborated  in  modernity  –  a  notion  he  harshly
criticizes as still belonging to an epistemological worldview – as something that, unlike
morality,  is  able  to  escape  human  finitude  and  contingency.  Within  a  naturalistic
hermeneutical  framework,  Rorty  contests  the  ontological  need  for  necessary
connections or disconnections between moral and scientific discourse. Bella’s proposal
to  read  Rorty’s  appropriation  of  hermeneutics  along  the  lines  of  his  recovery  of
pragmatism may contribute to renovating the current lines of debate around Rorty and
pragmatism,  especially  by  reevaluating  Rorty’s  strong  cultural  connection  to  the
American philosophical tradition and his commitment to making this pluralistic voice
relevant again to contemporary conversations.
5 In “Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability. Richard Rorty as an Example,”
Ángeles  J.  Perona  affirms  that  rather  than  rejecting  rationality  and  truth,  Rorty’s
pragmatism is consistent with a fallibilist model of rationality. However, it differs in an
important sense: instead of establishing epistemological fallibilism in relation to truth
and objectivity and then extending it to all forms of rational activity, Rorty’s fallibilism
emanates  from an ethical  stance.  For  Perona,  Rorty’s  fallibilism “does  not  focus  so
much  on  the  permanent  possibility  of  error  and  the  consequent  impossibility  of
achieving unconditional truths, as on the ethical objective of avoiding any relapse into
authoritarianism.” Perona offers a frame for usefully evaluating Rorty’s attention to
ethics and social relations in the notion of cognitive vulnerability, a broader category
than fallibilism which entails an awareness of “the limitations of our cognitive abilities
and the conditions to exercise them,” including conditions of power and domination
that  perpetuate forms of  epistemic injustice.  Ultimately,  she finds that  while  Rorty
“bases the norms of all rational interaction on a democratic social ethics developed on
the existential background of vulnerability,” his fallibilism is unduly pessimistic as a
result of its reduction of all appeals to the evidence of experience as authoritarian and
his related inability to see even the epistemic activity within normal conversational
exchanges as playing a role in altering the conditions that give rise to vulnerability.
6 In “Two Forms of Realism: Making Sense of Rorty’s Controversy with Brandom and
Ramberg  over  Objectivity,”  Yvonne  Hütter-Almerigi  sheds  welcome  light  on  an
intriguing,  Rorty-inspired  debate  among both  neopragmatists  and  New Pragmatists
that turns on the relation of realism, representationalism, and objectivity. Specifically,
she interjects  several  key clarifications regarding Rorty’s  perplexing insistence that
there is a difference between Robert Brandom’s notion of “made true by facts” and the
idea of “getting things right,” which Bjørn Ramberg spurred Rorty to accept. As Hütter-
Almerigi explains, there is a substantive change in Rorty’s stance in his 2000 response
to Ramberg: where he previously held that there are only causal word-world relations,
after Ramberg he recognizes that there are non-causal, though non-representational,
relations as well. She pinpoints the precise locus of this shift in a change in Rorty’s
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understanding of Davidson’s conception of triangulation that seemingly moves Rorty
closer to Brandom. Yet she helps us understand why this is not the case: Brandom’s
perspective  retains  a  representational  scheme  which  entails  distinct  realms  for
unconceptualized reality and our application of concepts. Brandom’s sense of objects as
non-perspectival  has  “ontological  aspirations”  that  Rorty  rightly  objects  to  for  its
implicit reliance on a scheme-content distinction. For Rorty, claims are not “made true
by facts,” but instead are based on the Davidsonian triangle. That is, where Brandom
relies  on  a  conception  of  facts  beyond vocabularies  to  secure  objectivity,  the  view
Ramberg and Rorty accept gets there via successful vs. unsuccessful interactions with
the world.  Hütter-Almerigi  holds that for Rorty,  “Claims do not have to ‘get things
right’ beyond vocabularies since if we ‘get things right’ we cope successfully with our
peers and the world.” Fully understood, Rortyan redescription does not absent reality;
rather, it rearranges our attention by altering causal dispositions that in turn affect
reality.
7 Emil  Višňovský’s  expansive,  in-depth  elaboration  of  “Rorty’s  Humanism:  Making  it
Explicit”  helpfully  contextualizes  the  neopragmatist’s  humanistic  and  Romantic
commitments  in  relation  to  a  wide  historical  array  of  humanists,  both  within  and
outside  the  pragmatic  tradition.  His  reading  expands  our  understanding  of  Rorty’s
humanism to encompass not only the standard romantic fare but the pragmatist notion
of  human  “coping”  with  reality  and  his  antirepresentationalism.  Even  Rorty’s
metaphilosophical orientation is informed by “his reaction to what can be termed the
anti-humanism of professional philosophy.” Rorty’s ethnocentrism, which entails that
“Philosophers must reflect on who they are as members of a particular, historically
concrete community and culture,” for Višňovský also is a “pillar” of his humanism.
Višňovský  affirms  Kate  Soper’s  identification  of  the  elitism  and  gender-blindness
endemic  to  Rorty’s  humanism,  while  raising  questions  about  her  assumption  that
Rorty’s anti-realism is incompatible with humanism. Rorty’s humanism holds that “we
should turn from nonhuman to human reality in our social practices.” It is not a stretch
to understand Rorty’s entire philosophico-political project, including both its epistemic
and ethical commitments, as an effort to realize a humanistic culture. Višňovský argues
for extending Rortyan humanism into our current post- and trans-humanist era, while
at  the  same  time  recognizing  its  limitations  around  the  role  of  non-linguistic
experience and its cordoning off of individual self-perfection in the private sphere and
of liberal democracy in the public.
8 In perhaps the most comprehensive account to date of what Brandom has called “the
‘vocabulary’ vocabulary,” Mauro Santelli’s “Redescribing Final Vocabularies: A Rortian
Picture of Identity and Selfhood” highlights the relative lack of attention this signature
concept  received  by  Rorty  himself,  as  well  as  the  absence  of  agreement  among
commentators about how to interpret the notion of final vocabularies. Santelli gathers
together the insights  Rorty offers  for  a  “pragmatic  naturalist  conception” of  moral
identity,  but  also  raises  critical  questions  regarding  Rorty’s  privileging  of  final
vocabularies in his understanding of self and identity – why are words more central
than  beliefs  and  desires,  which  Rorty  elsewhere  made  central?  He  helpfully
disaggregates the implicit Wittgensteinian, Sellarsian, and Davidsonian commitments
entailed by Rorty’s understanding of vocabularies, their relation to social practices, and
their normative import. Introducing conceptions from George Herbert Mead and from
sociolinguistics, Santelli generates additional clarity regarding this widely-known yet
elusive category of Rorty’s. Specifically, understanding final vocabularies as subsets of
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our “sociolects and idiolects” enables us to grasp Rorty’s contribution: “just as Rorty
can be considered as linguistifying a pragmatist theory of identity in which the social is
primitive  like  Mead’s  social  psychology,  he  can  also  be  considered  as  moralizing
sociolinguistic  considerations  about  the  relationship between  speech  and  identity.”
Words, Santelli holds, offer more flexible and pluralistic ways of marking our relation
to  communities  and are  a  better  measure  of  what  we  share,  than beliefs.  He  then
illuminates how Rorty’s way of thinking about vocabularies and narratives of moral
identity  provides  resources  for  understanding  the  entanglement  of  speech  and
devalued social status, in form of the way implicit biases rely on words, that is endemic
to epistemic injustice.
9 The issue’s final two essays probe the nature and limits of Rorty’s underappreciated
contributions to the topics of education and pedagogy. Stefano Oliverio’s “Dead-ending
Philosophy?  On Rorty’s  Literary  Culture,  Democratic  Ethos  and Political  Education”
takes  up one of  the core assumptions of  Rorty’s  project  –  namely,  that  fostering a
democratic  ethos entails  not  only shifting from a predominantly philosophical  to  a
literary  culture  but  making  edification  through  literature  the  primary  means  of
democratic  education.  Oliverio  insightfully  compares  and  contrasts  the  educational
approaches of  Rorty and Dewey,  but also expands the conversation using Cornelius
Castoriadis as a bridge to a philosophical side of the democratic culture and ethos that
Rorty  may have  unnecessarily  rejected.  The  essay  then develops  a  conception of  a
democratic philosophical culture oriented toward the education of citizens by drawing
on the Philosophy for Children (P4C) paradigm, via Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp,
which fosters an “individualizing-critical” mode much earlier in cognitive development
than Rorty’s  proposal  for  postponing “individualization”  and critical  thinking  until
post-secondary education, limiting the pre-secondary education to “socialization.” On
Oliverio’s view, P4C practices a form of “Socratic pragmatism” closer to Dewey than
Rorty  and the  latter’s  embrace  of  E. D. Hirsch’s  program of  “cultural  literacy.”  P4C
offers resources to augment Rorty’s narrowing of political education to the cultivation
of the literary imagination and to help avoid a politicized conception of socialization
which elevates the inculcation of values over their critical questioning. At the same
time, Oliverio discerns how Rorty may be used to develop more fully the moral use of
literary texts by rectifying P4C’s neglect of  “creative and caring thinking” and bias
toward the analytical-logical.
10 In  “Notes  from the  Playground:  The  Educational  Process  Between Contingency  and
Luck,”  Maura  Striano  provides  an  interesting  and  updated  examination  of  the
potentialities  of  Rorty’s  reflections  on  education,  focusing  mainly  on  his  widely
discussed distinction between socialization and individualization. Striano moves from
an episode of Rorty’s adolescence – one that according to Striano, Richard Bernstein
would have called a “concrete social form[s] of cruelty” (1992: 287) – that probably
affected Rorty’s reflection: “when he was an adolescent, bullies regularly used to beat
him up in the playground of his high school, an action that he was unable to avoid.” In
this narration Striano illuminates Rorty’s invitation to “acknowledge the capacity that
each individual has to create and re-create one’s self, diverting one’s path away from
expected  roles  and  performances.”  She  takes  it  as  a  crucial  point  to  investigate
education as a form of “edification” that always implies a process of (re)modulation of
the relationship between the individual and the society: “a process taking us ‘out of our
old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’ (Rorty 1979:
360).” Considering the new generation of scholars’ line of interpretation, which aims to
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smooth  over  the  contrast  between the  two educational  phases  identified  by  Rorty,
Striano  wonders  what  it  currently  means  to  adopt  and  extend  Rorty’s  theoretical
proposal  in  the  educational  field,  questioning,  particularly,  how  to  interpret  his
insistence on the importance of “luck”, which is an element constantly present in the
educational process.
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NOTES
1. Recently  published  books  on  Rorty  include:  Calcaterra  (2019);  Chin  (2018);  Curtis  (2015);
McClean (2016); Schulenberg (2015); and Skowroński (2015). 
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